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Violence in Ming-Qing China :
An Overview
William T. Rowe
Let us begin with a basic fact : the level of violence in late imperial China was probably as high as that in any historical society in the world.1 Obvious as this 
may sound, it is easy to miss it. The entire central message of the package of literati 
values that we refer to as ‘Confucianism’, and especially after its elaboration into 
the so-called ‘school of principle’ or ‘neo-Confucianism’ (lixue) after the eleventh 
century CE, was certainly more energetic than most elite  cultures in esteeming civil 
(wen) over military (wu) values, in  condemning violent behavior, and establishing 
peaceful, ordered, harmonious social behavior as a moral imperative. The monotony 
of this message has led many historians (including me) to see this  constructed norm 
as reflective of reality, whereas in fact it was a coping mechanism for dealing with a 
world which, as its inhabitants well knew, was violent and disorderly.
Some have argued that there was a class dynamic at work here : whereas genuine 
literati would abhor violence, the lower class population was free to develop its 
own counter- culture, with more vigorous and  combative strains. There is some truth 
to this, I think. There clearly was something of a ‘civilizing process’ underway in 
imperial China is which elites progressively abandoned blood sports, hunting, and 
the duel. But as Barend ter Haar has pointed out, the  elite’s progressive eschewing 
of violence was very selective : those literati who would not think to shoot an animal 
would not hesitate to beat their servants and, at times, their wives.2 Terminology 
describing violence was strongly and nearly uniformly  condemnatory (bào, hàn, 
měng, héng, kuáng), but the possibility also existed to invoke these terms against the 
grain. A ‘mad’ dog was kuang, but so too might be a painter of wild originality. As 
early as the third century BCE the Grand Historian Sima Qian used ‘baokuang’ to 
describe popular uprisings that were brutal and violent, but also morally warranted.
Late imperial China, of course, was witness to several of the most hair-raising 
bloodbaths in human history. During the last years of the Ming (1368-1644), for 
example, very large-scale rebel movements cut swaths of slaughter across the 
empire ; the rebel Zhang Xianzhong – ‘the butcher of Sichuan’ – is said to have 
depopulated that large and densely inhabited province by half, so that nearly 
a century later the governor reported that fully 80% of the population were still 
settlers from other provinces who had replaced the exterminated locals. The Taiping 
rebellion of 1851-1864, which killed by  conservative estimates some thirty million 
1 This article is drawn from a talk presented to the  conference on ‘History of Mass Violence in Russia 
and China’, held in Helsinki in May 2012, and chaired by Pieter Spierenburg and Marianna Mura-
vyeva. I am grateful to the chairs and the  conference participants for helpful  comments on that talk.
2 Haar (2000).
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people, was almost certainly the bloodiest civil war the world has ever seen. But it is 
not these events that will be my  concern in this paper. Rather, we will  concentrate on 
 cultural, political, and social factors that  contributed to the persistence of violence in 
the more routine ‘prosperous times’ (shengshi). Literally hundreds of thousands of 
cases of murder made their way up to the Qing Board of Punishments for review of 
the sentence, and clearly this only represented the tip of the iceberg.3
CULTURAL UNDERPINNINGS OF LATE IMPERIAL VIOLENCE
Numerous  cultural features of late imperial and modern China  conditioned 
acceptance of violence as a normal part of life. Butchering of animals, bloody 
religious sacrifices, executions in pubic marketplaces, and the display of severed 
heads, were all encountered as routine processes of  childhood socialization. I 
personally remember leading my young  children through a market in Taipei just as a 
butcher was cutting heads off  chickens, who ran around frantically before collapsing 
in a pool of blood. (I feared that my  children would be traumatized for life, but 
instead their reaction was a thrilled “Can we see that again ?”) The sociologist Yang 
Su describes an event from his early  childhood in Guangxi province, in which a 
crowd of farmers armed only with blunt farm tools slowly beat an old ox to death in 
the field ; it was, Yang claims, a life-altering event for him.4
Among the most ubiquitous  cultural tropes in late imperial Chinese  culture – 
elite as well as popular – was that of the yuxia (‘knight-errant’/ assassin), the silent 
killer who operates by his own strict personal moral code. The trope again goes back 
at least to the ancient historian Sima Qian, and has its modern avatars in such figures 
as Toshiro  Mifune’s ronin samurai and Clint  Eastwood’s ‘man with no name.’ A 
more universally accessible version of the yuxia was the haohan (‘tough guy’) : 
an affable sort characterized by his indifference to sex and money, immunity to 
pain, and love of murderous violence, sometimes for righteous reasons but as often 
simply because it is just good fun.5 An enormous literature sprang up  concerning 
the tough guy, eagerly  consumed not only by young males, but, to a lesser extent, 
females as well. The countryside was strewn with martial arts academies and boxing 
associations (quanshe), as well as scenes of former battles and uprisings, old bandit 
lairs, and other ‘sites of memory’  commemorating violent heroes and villains of the 
past. A graphic ‘unofficial’ historiography (yeshi), aided by the emergence of cheap 
 commercial publishing, reinforced these stories and memories.
A yet more basic  cultural element in late imperial China was the ‘demonic 
paradigm’, argued by ter Haar to be probably the oldest stratum of Chinese popular 
religion.6 Dead souls may in select instances become gods, or in cases where they 
are well tended to by living descendants become benign ancestral spirits (shen). 
The remainder become ghosts or demons (gui). These demons inhabit the material 
world in countless numbers. They have an insatiable hunger for human flesh, 
3 See for example the  contribution in this issue by Thomas Buoye.
4 Yang (2011).
5 Ruhlmann (1960) ; Jenner (1996).
6 For various of ter  Haar’s explication of the “demonic paradigm,” see ter Haar (1998, chapter 6 ; 2002, 
2006). For a particularly detailed case study of the paradigm in practice, see Kuhn (1990).
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especially internal organs. Constant human effort must be devoted to warding off 
these hungry demons, via talismans and exorcistic rites, and to killing or smashing 
these supernatural predators wherever possible. (Indeed, many a local bandit in 
late imperial and modern China advanced his career by styling himself a ‘demon-
slayer’.) Thus, human beings not only have a right, but an obligation based on self-
preservation, to engage in  constant ongoing violence against demonic forces. 
Demons are shape-shifters, and regularly appear in human form. This has 
several implications for social behavior. For one thing,  condemned criminals in 
late imperial China were frequently physically abused or their clothing torn so as 
to make them appear demonic prior to execution. More ominously, unidentified 
outsiders, suspicious drifters, and even the local underclass might  come to be seen 
by the established population as predatory demons demanding violent treatment. 
This could and routinely was implied to any person or groups against which one 
stood in opposition – they are demons, and thus their violent extermination is a 
moral imperative. (Ter Haar provocatively argues that this line of thinking was 
effectively invoked to legitimate violence against ‘class enemies’ during the Cultural 
Revolution.) The demonic paradigm was embedded in a  complex corpus of Grimm-
like  children’s tales. Scapegoating of suspicious persons as demons seems to have 
occurred with ever greater frequency and scale from the Ming on, invoked to 
identify human targets of vendetta action. In celebrated instances, the demonizing 
process was turned against foreign missionaries (accused of eating internal organs 
of Chinese  children) in the so-called ‘Tianjin massacre’ of 1870, the series of violent 
anti-foreign crowd actions in the Yangzi valley in the early 1890s, and murders of 
Chinese Christian  converts during the Boxer uprising of 1900.
David  Johnson’s impressive research on north China popular exorcistic drama 
in the late imperial era shows how this paradigm was  continually reinforced and 
reproduced over generations. Typically as part of the New  Year’s celebration in rural 
villages, demons would  come on stage, covered with blood and wearing animal 
parts as their costume. They would leave the stage and run through the crowd, 
splattering blood on members of the audience, and stealing pieces of raw meat from 
local storefronts. Then they would return to the stage, where they were appropriately 
beheaded – e.g. a pumpkin filled with animal blood was smashed over the  actor’s 
head. It was a performance suitably terrifying to all observers.7
THE STATE AND VIOLENCE
The late imperial state  contributed to the  culture of violence in a variety of ways. 
It was itself a major practitioner of extreme violence, for example in the criminal 
justice system, in which torture was a routine and precisely legislated part of the 
process. Normally, the more severe criminal penalties could not be imposed without a 
 confession, and that  confession was most often acquired as a result of judicial torture. 
These penalties themselves included a class of ‘tormented punishments’, including 
most notoriously the ‘death by a thousand cuts’ (lingchi), studied by Timothy Brook 
and his colleagues.8 Tormented punishments were designed to achieve destruction of 
7 Johnson (2010).
8 Brook, Bourgon, Blue (2008). See also the  contribution by Bourgon in the present issue.
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the body and hence carry the punishment over into the afterlife. They were imposed 
highly selectively, and  constituted the terrorist-coercive  component of the imperial 
 state’s tripartite strategy of rule, along with material nurturance of the people 
(yangmin) and moral and ritual indoctrination (jiaohua).
In its practice of warfare and counter-insurgency the state generally divided 
strategy into two approaches. The first was ‘pacification’ (fu), in which the goal 
was to capture and execute key opposition leaders and then issue amnesty for the 
rank and file of their presumably deluded followers. The second was ‘extermination’ 
(jiao), which entailed annihilation of all real or suspected enemies and their family 
members to several decrees of relationship. For example, the loyalist general (and 
later high official) Li Hongzhang in 1864 summarily slaughtered at least twenty 
thousand Taiping prisoners of war in recaptured Suzhou.9 Extermination might even 
be undertaken pro-actively : upon hearing of the Taiping capture of Nanjing in 1853, 
the Qing governor-general at Guangzhou, several hundred miles from the battlefront, 
 conducted a mass execution of tens of thousands of suspected rebel sympathizers 
in his jurisdiction – men, women, and  children included. One Western observer 
 commented on the efficiency of this process, counting some sixty-three beheadings 
in a single four-minute span.10 Another favored counter-insurgency technique, in 
increasing use after the White Lotus rebellion of the turn of the nineteenth century, 
was that of scorched earth (jianbi qingye), herding all trusted inhabitants of a war 
zone into a network of fortified villages and burning all settlements and fields outside 
their perimeter, to starve out the enemy.
The Qing was also a highly successful expansionist empire, by most accounts 
roughly doubling the territory ruled by its predecessor the Ming. This process 
entailed securing  control over interior or frontier regions that had long been assumed 
to be part of ‘China’ but had not been effectively occupied or administered by any 
Chinese state – areas such as Taiwan, Hainan island, the southwest, and mountainous 
areas within central China itself, all occupied largely by indigenous peoples against 
whom new settlers and imperial administrators asserted their claims in the face of 
varying levels of resistance. Expansionism also took place on the borderlands, as 
huge territories such as the Manchu homeland itself, large stretches of Mongolia, 
Muslim central Asia, and Tibet were newly claimed as part of the empire. Much of 
this expansion was accomplished either by negotiation or by  conquest of a relatively 
bloodless sort. But there were periodic exceptions, when a frustrated Qing state 
resorted to genocidal policies to speed up its incorporation project. In 1735-1736, 
for example, the Qing governor Zhang Guangsi decided, largely on his own, to 
exterminate some 18,000 men, women, and  children of an indigenous population 
in Guizhou who had the temerity to rise in resistance to his sinification policies. In 
the northwestern Mongol proto-state of Zongharia, the Qianlong emperor, fed up 
with the protracted warfare between Zonghar and Qing from the 1690s to the 1750s, 
opted for the final solution : he sent in a massive military force which killed more 
than half a million people, deliberately emptied the land for new colonization, and 
effectively eliminated the Zonghar people from subsequent human history.11
 9 Fei (2012).
10 Platt (2012).
11 Perdue (2005) Part Two.
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Pieter Spierenburg suggests that Western European states in the early modern 
era ever more effectively claimed a monopoly on the use of violence within their 
territories.12 Was this true of imperial China as well ? Clearly not to the same extent as 
in the West. The state  continued to sanction private violence in a variety of ways. For 
one thing, private exaction of blood vengeance was legitimated by both the Ming and 
Qing Codes, though in highly specified and restricted circumstances. In certain times 
and places, lineage headmen were empowered by the state to impose both corporal 
and capital punishments on their deviant members. Most ubiquitously, although the 
state did formally claim a monopoly on military organization, local elite-led militia 
were tolerated in practice throughout the Ming and Qing for the primary purpose of 
defense against the local bandits with whom the militia formed something of a stable 
equilibrium. Beginning with the  Qing’s suppression of the Triad-led Lin Shuangwen 
rebellion in Taiwan in the 1780s, and ever more fundamentally in the White Lotus 
campaigns of the turn of the century and the Taiping campaigns of the 1850s and 
1860s, the Qing state relied upon such private militia to fight its own wars for it. One 
scholar, indeed, has argued that the White Lotus war might have ended years before it 
did if the state had been able to exert  control over local private militia who were in the 
profitable business of claiming victories over increasingly imaginary rebel armies.13
At the same time, the Qing state in particular did maintain an impressive, 
very costly, highly sophisticated, and expanding mechanism for the resolution of 
civil disputes, at least in part for the purpose of deterring private violence. As the 
archival record makes clear, the amount of litigation heard on a daily basis by the 
all-purpose county magistrate rose progressively over time, becoming far the most 
time- consuming aspect of his duties. Everyone in the bureaucratic system bewailed 
this fact, but none seriously proposed that the state refuse to hear such disputes, and 
instead numerous remedies were proposed to help clear up the growing backlog 
of cases in all jurisdictions. As Philip Huang has demonstrated, one increasingly 
routine expedient was for the magistrate to  convene an initial hearing for each piece 
of litigation, suggest what his decision might be, then propose to the litigants that 
they might get a more favorable settlement if they brought the case to a local elder for 
resolution ; only if that failed would the magistrate hear the case in detail and resolve 
it personally.14 With the recognition that the Qing state willingly devoted such an 
enormous percentage of its energies to seeking peaceful and socially acceptable 
solutions to private disputes, one scholar has suggested that our image of that state 
ought to be revised from that of the harsh and arbitrary paternal disciplinarian of the 
‘Oriental Despotism’ school, to that of a beleaguered father trying patiently to keep 
the peace among his sibling  children.15
VIOLENCE AND SOCIAL CHANGE
The Ming and Qing eras, especially the three hundred years after the mid-sixteenth 
century – the period often referred to as early modern China – was one of wrenching 
12 Spierenburg (2008).
13 Robinson (2001) ; Kuhn (1970) ; Dai (2009).
14 Huang (1996).
15 The suggestion is that of Peter C. Perdue, private  conversation.
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social change. Such changes included rapid demographic growth, unprecedented 
levels of geographic and occupational mobility, expansion of the polity to include 
regions both internal and external in which the local population was other than 
‘Chinese’, and a frenetic process of private association-building and formal social 
organization.16 Each of these changes had marked impacts on structures of  conflict 
and levels of violence within the society.
The  empire’s population grew at least threefold over the course of the Qing alone, 
and most likely fivefold over the late imperial era as a whole. As James Lee and 
Wang Feng have demonstrated, this population growth was not exactly unplanned : 
it was a direct function of more relaxed social attitudes in response to perceptions 
of increasing economic opportunities, leading to ‘preventive checks’ on increased 
household size. Lee and Feng are keen to point out that there were several types of 
‘preventive checks’ employed by the Qing population, including increased spacing 
between procreation activity, but it is also clear that the most important check was on 
the violent practice of infanticide. Infanticide was usually – though not exclusively 
– inflicted on of females. It was practiced routinely, although more extensively in 
times of short-term economic crisis, and was systematically adjusted as a response 
to changes in structures of economic opportunity.17 It is not unreasonable to estimate 
that, at least ten percent of newborns in the Qing empire were murdered at birth, in 
spite of perceptions that this was a ‘prosperous age’ (shengshi).
The remarkable population growth during the early-modern era was well 
recognized by  contemporaries, both within and outside the administration, and in 
a number of ways it  contributed directly to incidence of interpersonal violence. 
Thomas Buoye, for example, has carefully documented the correlation of increasing 
population-to-land ratios with murder rates in various regions of the empire ; 
specifically, as population pressure grew, notions of property rights became 
hardened, and disputes over the way these newly- conceived – and increasingly 
state-enforced – rights impinged upon ‘moral economy’ notions of patrimony and 
birthright, led to fatal disputes.18 Another byproduct of population growth, even in 
an era of somewhat relaxed practices of female infanticide, was an increasingly 
skewed sex ratio. The sociologist Ted Telford has demonstrated that among even 
relatively affluent males there was an increasingly evident inability over the course 
of the mid – to late Qing to fulfill the moral imperative to find a wife and carry on 
the patriline.19 In other words, Qing society included an increasing percentage of 
unmarried males – the so-called ‘bare sticks’ (guanggun) who were, by virtue of 
their lack of family obligations, prima facie a threat to a social and political order 
that was so explicitly based on the domestic unit. These figures, with nothing to 
anchor their moral behavior (wulai) and no one to whom to be held accountable 
(wuzhu), increasingly developed a bachelor sub- culture of their own. As chronic 
under-employment worsened over the nineteenth century, and especially with the 
massive military demobilization following the great mid-century rebellions, these 
rootless types increasingly formed an urban underclass of ‘thugs’ (pigun), engaging 
in intimidating street-corner martial-arts displays and public brawls. In late Qing 
16 See Rowe (2002).
17 Lee, Wang (1999).
18 Buoye (2000).
19 Telford (1992).
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Tianjin, they emerged as a self- conscious  cultural type known as the ‘hunhunr’, with 
distinctive oversized clothing and stylized ways of walking – a group reminiscent 
of the ‘Apaches’ in turn-of-the-century Paris or the ‘zootsuiters’ in early twentieth-
century American cities.
The increasing occupational specialization of the late imperial economy 
 contributed in some cases to new incidents of collective violence. In one rural area 
of central China, for example, large groups of fishermen and farmers, both organized 
by lineage, fought protracted and often bloody battles for decades over the issue 
of whether to  construct a dam at a key water outlet : the dam  convenienced the 
fishermen but threatened flooding to the fields of the farmers.20 In cities, groups of 
porters and carters, finely specialized in types of carriage, fought recurring turf wars 
over rights-of-way and  control over the cargoes at individual piers.
Yet more provocative of collective violence was the ethnic  conflict brought about 
by much higher incidence of geographic mobility in the late Ming and Qing. Part of 
this was due to migration and  conflict over land use. For example, south China was 
famous for the  continuous warfare between ‘Punti’, who saw themselves as earlier 
settlers of the region, and ‘Hakka’, a distinctive  cultural and linguistic group who 
were portrayed by the Punti as late-arriving interlopers. This lingering animosity 
was an important  contributor to the outbreak of the Taiping movement – the first 
Taiping being largely Hakka – in the mid-nineteenth century. A more generalized 
social type – not as  culturally distinctive as the Hakka, but like them practicing 
shifting agriculture and other upland occupational specialties – were the so-called 
‘shed people’ (pengmin), who were in  constant warfare with their lowland neighbors 
over issues such as deforestation and topsoil runoff.21
In the  empire’s increasingly cosmopolitan  commercial cities, several scores of 
local-origin diaspora groupings of sojourners, both long and short-term, coexisted 
uneasily. Capable of impressive cross-ethnic cooperation in times of economic, 
social, or military threats to their  common host city, they also found routine 
provocation for individual and collective violence. One representative example 
occurred in the wake of a wine-shop argument in Hankou in 1878 between two well-
lubricated customers speaking different local dialects : mushrooming numbers of 
recruits joined the eventually bloody fray,  coming to the aid of their fellow natives 
merely on the basis of shared local dialect.22 In cities where a particular local origin 
group dominated the local economy, and especially where the dominant group was 
outsiders and the subjected one  consisted of local natives, there was even more 
likelihood for lingering ethnic tensions to turn violent. In the Hunan rice-exporting 
city of Xiangtan in 1819, for example, a spike in grain prices on the local  consumer 
market prompted native Hunanese to riot violently against the Jiangxi merchants 
who  controlled the export trade.23
In the Qing empire, of course, the greatest latent ethnic animosity was between the 
majority population which saw itself as ‘Chinese’ (Hua or, later, Han), and the Qing 
 conquest elite.24 Historians differ over the question of whether or not the latter group 
20 Rowe (1988).
21 Leong (1997).
22 Rowe (1989, pp.189-190).
23 Perdue (1986).
24 For a recent examination of the emergence of Han racial self- consciousness, see Mullaney et al. (2012).
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genuinely  constituted a ‘Manchu’ nationality prior to the  conquest, but most would 
 concur that by the nineteenth century, at least, Manchu bannermen cordoned off in 
garrison  compounds within selected cities both self-identified and were identified by 
their Chinese hosts as ethnically or even racially different. Under stress, animosity 
between the two groups could lead to violence. For instance, as British troops sailed 
up the Yangzi toward Nanjing during the Opium War of 1839-1842, they passed 
through the garrison city of Zhenjiang ; stirred on by panicky administrators on 
both the Manchu and Chinese sides, local people of each group attacked each other, 
scapegoating their counterparts as potential sell-outs to the Europeans.25 The rising 
tide of Social Darwinist-inspired Han nationalism during the final decade of the 
Qing brought this racial hatred ever more threateningly to the surface. Memories 
of ‘atrocities’ and ‘massacres’ of local Chinese populations  committed during the 
seventeenth century (relatively few, in fact, and often undertaken by the  Qing’s 
Han-Chinese allies) were reawakened by republication of witnesses’ diaries over 
the  empire’s final decades. When the revolution finally broke out in late 1911, 
the enfeebled and encloistered garrison-dwellers made ready targets for ‘national 
revenge’ pogroms. In one of the worst cases, an anti-Manchu genocide in the garrison 
city of  Xi’an in October 1911 claimed the lives of an estimated ten thousand men, 
women, and  children of the long-established local banner population.26
A direct  consequence of the increased opportunities and heightened  competition 
of the mid-Qing era of economic prosperity and population growth, I would argue, 
was an explosion of association-building that took many forms, but all of which 
were designed, at bottom, to provide their members the numerical solidarity with 
which to take better advantage of their changing social environment. The archetype 
of Chinese association-building was the lineage organization, the numbers and sizes 
of which grew rapidly in this era. Lineages were useful for a nearly inexhaustible 
range of mutual-benefit functions, but violence and coercion were prominent among 
them. In the lightly-governed Fujian and Taiwan, for example, lineages engaged 
in protracted armed feuds, often led and instigated by professional martial arts 
teachers. In the  commercialized rice agriculture of  Guangdong’s Pearl River Delta, 
powerful armed lineages managed to effectively enslave their tenant workforce, 
frequently itself organized into lineage organizations for self-defense.27 Another 
form of popular association was the work gang (bang), organized on the basis of 
occupation and/or local origin, of the sort we have already seen fighting over turf and 
right-to-work in  commercial cities. Those superfluous males unable for whatever 
reason to organize on the basis of kinship, trade, or local origin, gradually evolved 
forms of fraternity or society (hui, she), in most cases initially for self-protection, but 
also for violent predation, smuggling, and other forms of racketeering. Sometimes 
but not always these associations added a sectarian religious  component to cement 
their solidarity. Often initially very localized and ad hoc, the most successful of 
these organizations – including the Triads (Tiandihui), the Society of Elder Brothers 
(Gelaohui), and the Green Gang (Qingbang) – came to effectively govern major 
25 Elliott (1990).
26 Rhoads (2001).
27 Lamley (1990) ; Watson (1977).
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cities, regions, and transport routes, and became the progenitors of the criminal 
underworld of twentieth-century China.28
Finally there were bandits (tufei). Bandits came in a wide spectrum of scales, 
goal-structures, and intended permanency. They were to a certain extent a function 
of the agrarian ecology : springing into action in times of bad harvest and retreating 
into agrarian practice in better times, and plying the borders between county 
jurisdictions. Some more ambitious bandits developed persona as ‘demon-slayers’, 
as we have seen, or Robin Hood-like ‘social bandit’ ideologies. As David Robinson 
has demonstrated, tufei in practice effectively worked out a more-or-less stable 
equilibrium – an ‘economy of violence’ – in tandem with government troops and 
local militia and, indeed, as Elizabeth Perry has demonstrated for the ecologically 
fragile Huaibei region of north China, the boundary between bandit and local militia 
– between predator and protector – was highly  conditional and permeable.29
The protectionist counterpart of the tufei was the tuhao, the local strongman. 
Large landholders with martial inclinations, strongmen in many isolated parts of 
the interior  constructed hilltop forts (zhai or bao), for retreat in times of danger. 
Often they would invite their neighbors to join them, and temporary populations of 
such forts might reach the thousands. The forts might endure for centuries : some 
in the Dabie Shan mountains on the Hubei-Henan border were first built during 
the bloody Yuan-Ming transition, were inhabited again during the chaos of the late 
Ming and the Qing  conquest, again during the Taiping invasions, and can still be 
observed today. Forts in the Dabie Shan also formed alliances – the ‘Forty-Eight Fort 
League’ – spanning a relatively large geographic area, and  constituted in effect an 
autonomous region during the prolonged troubled times of the seventeenth century.30
VIOLENT PROTEST
Late-imperial urban protest assumed its most spectacular and violent form during 
the final reigns of the Ming, especially in the hyper-developed, increasingly socially 
 complex, and mal-administered cities of the lower Yangzi region. Urban uprisings 
in this era erupted in dozens of larger and smaller cities, grew out of a wide range of 
grievances, and focused on differing targets, but one of the distinguishing features 
 common to many of them was the unusual alliance against the forces of the state 
and of mercantile wealth on the part of lower-strata literati and urban artisans and 
laborers, especially in the textile trades. Three of the best-known cases can serve 
to illustrate this. In Hangzhou in 1582, apparently encouraged by a wage-protest 
mutiny in the  city’s military garrison, a broad alliance of workers and other renters 
led by a local schoolteacher rose up in protest of the labor service requirements 
imposed on them for service in the nightwatch, impositions from which degree-
holding gentry and most property holders were exempt. Over the course of five days 
they raided the homes of particularly hated patricians, in several cases murdering 
their entire families. In 1601 in Suzhou, like Hangzhou one of the  empire’s major 
silk-producing cities, in response to the imposition of new production taxes by a 
28 Within a rich literature, see Ownby (1996).
29 Robinson (2001) ; Perry (1986).
30 Rowe (2007).
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local administrator, and the resulting closure of many handicraft workshops by their 
proprietors, newly unemployed weavers and dyers, joined by lower gentry members 
and students of the Imperial University, rampaged through the city attacking the 
homes and murdering a range of officials and clerks involved in the tax-collection 
bureaucracy. Finally, again in Suzhou in 1626, agents of the hated court eunuch Wei 
Zhongxian moved in to arrest a celebrated local dissident scholar, and were greeted 
violently by a crowd  comprised not only of the  scholar’s literati allies but also of 
workmen and the urban underclass who took this excuse to resist the hated local 
public security authorities.31
Protest activity was not as spectacular in the high Qing as in the tumultuous late 
Ming, but, despite that  era’s reputation for peace and harmony, it hardly disappeared 
altogether. Indeed, a team of scholars from Chinese  People’s University  combing 
through the Qing palace archives discovered some 58 cases of violent tax resistance 
and no fewer than 312 cases of rent resistance between the 1660s and the 1790s, 
and these counted only collective actions ; individual acts of violent tax and rent 
resistance were surely much more numerous.32 Uprisings by agrarian bondservants 
helped ignite the rebellions that toppled the Ming, but echoes of these  continued 
throughout the Qing, as vestigial pockets of unfree farm laborers, often responding 
to rumors of imperially-declared emancipations, inflicted violent reprisals on 
their masters.33 Food riots were more numerous, but, as in the West, tended to be 
somewhat routinized, and hence less violent, if all parties kept to the customary 
script : seize grain from perceived hoarders, sell it publically at a ‘fair price’, and 
go home. Local officials, often privately siding with the rioters,  concentrated on 
restoring social harmony rather than making criminal examples of hungry people. 
A late exception was the massive protest against the inflationary downriver export 
of Hunanese rice in Changsha in 1910, which forced the provincial governor to 
flee, drew overstrained Qing military forces to the city to put down the violence, 
and  contributed to precipitating the successful anti-dynastic revolution the following 
year.34
CULTURAL RESPONSES TO VIOLENCE
Qing administrators, elites, and  commoners responded to the alarming reality 
of violence among them in a variety of ways. Most ubiquitous was the propaganda 
barrage exhorting adherence to the values of Confucian harmony – for example, 
mandated fortnightly public recitations of the imperial “Sacred Edict” (shengyu) 
instructing subjects to get along with their neighbors, pay their taxes, and be 
economically productive. The very routineness of this political ritual must have 
fostered  complacence or even ridicule (though some enterprising professional Sacred 
Edit readers seem to have developed a repertoire of entertaining stories to illustrate 
each of the  Edict’s major points35). Yet the rhetoric of paternalistic ‘instructing and 
31 Within the large literature on late Ming urban uprisings, see Susuma (1993) and Santangelo (1993).
32 Kang-Yong-Qian shiqi chengxiang renmin fankang douzheng ziliao, Beijing : Chinese  People’s 
 University Press, 1979.
33 Ye (1983).
34 Bin Wong (1982) ; Rosenbaum, 1975.
35 Mair (1984).
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civilizing’ (jiaohua) had real  cultural power. In an episode deeply enshrined in local 
history, for example, the model prefect Yu Chenglong in 1674 rode out to  confront 
a rebel force alone, on a mule, and entreated them : “This year,  hasn’t the rainfall 
been adequate in these mountains ?  Haven’t the crops been growing well ? If so, why 
have you good people turned to rebellion ? Why have you invited so much butchery 
and slaughter upon yourselves ? The weather now, in midsummer, is extremely hot. 
At this time of year you should be attending to your aged parents, and your wives 
and  children, in the cool  comfort of your homes, rather than acting in this rash and 
suicidal way.” The rebels, we are told, wept and laid down their arms.36
A different kind of response to massive violence was exorcism. In the wake of 
the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, a panic spread within the population of the 
southeast coastal city of Quanzhou that vast armies of Chinese war dead, killed on 
the faraway battlefields of Manchuria and Korea, would descend as hungry ghosts 
to devour local citizens. An enormous city-wide exorcistic procession (jiao) was 
organized, led by an unusual collaboration of Confucianized imperial officials, 
Buddhist and Daoist clergy, and headmen of the various local  commercial and 
artisanal guilds. It seems to have worked.37
A  common means of sublimating chaotic violence was by ritualizing it. A much-
cited example is the annual rock fight held in nineteenth-century Lugang, a major 
port city in Taiwan through which much of the trade to the mainland was funneled. 
On a set day, members of the four leading lineages in the city would line up on 
separate sides of a field at the edge of town and hurl rocks at each other, leading 
to injuries but rarely deaths, and then go home at the end of the day ready to live 
in tense but peaceful  competition for the next year.38 In many central and southern 
Chinese cities, annual dragon boat races were held. Originating in an ancient 
aboriginal ritual in which the losers of the race were deliberately drowned, by the 
nineteenth century the dragon boat race had become a fully sinicized event in which 
boatmen and longshoremen from a  city’s various piers – frequently of differing local 
origins – would  compete to  construct the fastest boat to race across the harbor. As 
a  competition among diverse sub-ethnic groups for which the rules were shared 
and collectively understood, the dragon boat race  contributed to a greater sense of 
pan-urban  communal solidarity, at least among the maritime workforce.39 But that 
solidarity might cut two ways : in the 1819 Xiangtan riot mentioned earlier, it was 
the occasion of the dragon boat  festival that united the local Hunanese workforce to 
riot against the outsider Jiangxi merchants that dominated the local rice export trade.
In a powerful new book, Tobie Meyer-Fong surveys the way the population of 
the lower Yangzi valley reconstructed (shanhou) their  culture and society in the wake 
of the mind-numbing slaughter the region had experienced during the Taiping wars. 
They labored at burying the dead, areas of the region being littered with decomposed 
corpses for years or decades. They  compiled painstaking lists of ‘martyrs’, elevating 
victims of wanton violence into dedicated champions of the victorious Qing cause, 
and testimony to their  locality’s fervent imperial loyalism. They exhibited intense 
 survivor’s guilt, obsessing over loved ones they has lost, and had failed to save. They 
36 Rowe (2007, p.172).
37 Wang (1995).
38 DeGlopper (1977). 
39 Rowe (1989, pp. 201-206).
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engaged in a powerful wave of Confucian fundamentalist revivalism, struggling to 
understand how they had sinned, and why a benevolent Heaven would have allowed 
this holocaust to be visited upon them. Perhaps most importantly they attempted 
to domesticate the irrational slaughter by historicizing it, reducing it to a coherent 
historical narrative  complete with heroes and villains and lessons to be learned.40 
As the literary scholar David Der-wei Wang has argued,  containing memories of 
violence into “the monster that is history” is one time-honored Chinese means of 
managing the unbearable personal pain of past time as actually experienced.41
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Pieter Spierenburg takes note of a  consensus view that the early modern West 
saw a dramatic, long-term decline in homicide rates – perhaps as much as twenty-
fold in England, and yet more in Holland.42 Was the same true of early modern 
China ? Even lacking reliable numbers, I  don’t think any scholar would claim that 
the parallel was anywhere close. (Certainly, if one  considers infanticide as murder, 
no sharp protracted decline was apparent until the twentieth century, itself a very 
violent time in other regards).
What does this imply about Chinese  culture and society ? Several years ago I was 
presenting on a college campus my research on the centuries-long history of mass 
violence in the interior highland county of Macheng. A member of the audience, 
a distinguished anthropologist of Chinese descent, responded angrily : I was 
resurrecting, she argued, the Orientalist trope of ‘life is cheap’, the greater disrespect 
for human life in barbaric China versus the civilized West. Taken aback – this had 
certainly not been my  conscious intent – I responded by recounting a televised 
interview I had seen with the Chinese-American playwright Frank Ching (author of 
the The Chickencoop Chinaman). Contrary to the anthropologist, Ching was angry 
about the placidity assigned by outsiders to Chinese  culture : whereas male youths 
of other minority groups were seen as potentially violent and threatening, Chinese-
American young men were perceived as polite, peaceable, and malleable. This was 
a characterization that needed to be corrected by practice, he insisted, if Chinese 
people were ever to be granted the dignity they deserved. For my part, I hope that by 
recognizing anew the brutal violence that dogged Chinese history, we can likewise 
restore the dignity of the populations that suffered through it.
William T. Rowe
John Hopkins University









VIOLENCE IN MING-QING CHINA : AN OVERVIEW 97
REFERENCES
Anon. Kang-Yong-Qian shiqi chengxiang renmin fankang douzheng ziliao, Beijing, Chinese 
 People’s University Press, 1979.
Bin Wong, R., Food Riots in the Qing Dynasty, Journal of Asian Studies, 1982, 41-4. 
Brook, T., Bourgon, J., Blue, G., Death by a Thousand Cuts, Cambridge MA, Harvard 
University Press, 2008.
Buoye, T. M., Manslaughter, Markets, and Moral Economy : Violent Disputes over Property 
Rights in Eighteenth-Century China, Cambridge, CUP, 2000.
Dai Y., Civilians Go into Battle : Hired Militias in the White Lotus War, 1796-1805, Asia 
Major, Third Series, 2009, 22, 2, pp. 145-178.
DeGlopper, D., Social Structure in a Nineteenth-Century Taiwanese Port City, in Skinner 
G.W. (ed.), The City in Late Imperial China, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1977, 
pp. 633-650.
Elliott, M.C., Bannerman and Townsman : Ethnic Tension in Nineteenth-Century Jiangnan, 
Late Imperial China, 1990, 11, 1, pp. 36-74.
Fei Z., Li Hongzhang Suzhou shafeng shijian haiyuan, Qingshi yanjiu, 2012, 4.
Haar, B. ter, Ritual and Mythology of the Chinese Triads : Creating an Identity, Leiden, Brill, 
1998.
Haar, B. ter, Rethinking “Violence” in Chinese Culture, in Aijmer, G., Abbink, J. (Eds), 
Meanings of Violence : A Cross-Cultural Perspective, Oxford, Berg, 2000, pp. 123-140.
Haar, B. ter,  China’s Inner Demons : The Political Impact of the Demonological Paradigm, in 
Woei L. C. (ed.),  China’s Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution : Master Narratives and 
Post-Mao Counternarratives, Lanham MD, Rowman & Littlefield, 2002.
Haar, B. ter, Telling Stories : Witchcraft and Scapegoating in Chinese History, Leiden, Brill, 
2006.
Huang, P.C.C., Civil Justice in China : Representation and Practice in the Qing, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 1996.
Jenner, W.J.F., Tough Guys, Mateship, and Honour : Another Chinese Tradition, East Asian 
History, 1996, 12, pp. 1-33.
Johnson, D., Spectacle and Sacrifice : The Ritual Foundations of Village Life in North China, 
Cambridge MA., Harvard East Asian Monographs, 2010.
Kuhn, P. A., Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China : Militarization and Social 
Structure, Cambridge MA., Harvard University Press, 1970.
Kuhn, P. A., Soulstealers : The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768, Cambridge MA., Harvard 
University Press, 1990.
Lamley, H. J., Lineage and Surname Feuds in Southern Fukien and Eastern Kwangtung 
under the  Ch’ing, in Kwang- ching L. (ed.), Orthodoxy in Late Imperial China, Berkeley, 
University of California Press, 1990, pp. 255-280.
Lee, J.Z., Wang F., One Quarter of Humanity : Malthusian Myths and Chinese Realities, 
Cambridge MA., Harvard University Press, 1999.
Léong, S., Migration and Ethnicity in Chinese History : Hakka, Pengmin, and their Neighbors, 
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1997.
Mair, V.H., Language and Ideology in the Written Popularizations of the Sacred Edict, in 
Johnson, D. et al. (Eds), Popular Culture in Late Imperial China, Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1984, pp. 325-359.
Meyer-Fong, T., What Remains : Coming to Terms with Civil War in Nineteenth-Century 
China, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2013.
Mullaney, T. et al. (Eds), Critical Han Studies : The History, Representation, and Identity of 
 China’s Majority, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2012.
98 WILLIAM T. ROWE
Ownby, D., Brotherhoods and Secret Societies in Early and Mid-Qing China, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 1996.
Platt, S.R., Autumn in the Heavenly Kingdom : China, the West, and the Epic Story of the 
Taiping Civil War, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2012.
Perdue, P.C., Insiders and Outsiders : The Xiangtan Riot of 1819 and Collective Action in 
Hunan, Modern China, 1986, 12, 2, pp. 166-201.
Perdue, P.C., China Marches West : The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia, Cambridge MA., 
Harvard University Press, 2005.
Perry, E., Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1845-1945, Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 1986.
Rhoads, E.J.M., Manchus and Han : Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and 
Early Republican China, Seattle, University of Washington Press, 2001.
Robinson, D., Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven : The Economy of Violence in Mid-
Ming China, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 2001.
Rosenbaum, A.L., Gentry Power and the Changsha Rice Riot of 1910, Journal of Asian 
Studies, 1975, 34, 3, pp. 689-715.
Rowe, W., Water Control and the Qing Political Process, Modern China, 1988, 14, 4, pp. 353-
387.
Rowe, W., Hankow : Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796-1895, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 1989.
Rowe, W., Social Stability and Social Change, in Peterson, W.J. (ed.), The Cambridge History 
of China, Vol.9, Part I, Cambridge, CUP, 2002, pp. 473-562.
Rowe, W., Crimson Rain : Seven Centuries of Violence in a Chinese County, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 2007.
Ruhlmann, R., Traditional Heroes in Chinese Popular Fiction, in Wright, A.R. (ed.), The 
Confucian Persuasion, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1960.
Santangelo, P., Urban Society in Late Imperial Suzhou, in Cooke Johnson, L. (ed.), Cities of 
Jiangnan in Late Imperial China, Albany, SUNY Press, 1993.
Spierenburg, P., A History of Murder : Personal Violence in Europe from the Middle Ages to 
the Present, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2008.
Susuma F., Late Ming Urban Reform and the Popular Uprising in Hangzhou, in Cooke 
Johnson, L. (ed.), Cities of Jiangnan in Late Imperial China, Albany, SUNY Press, 1993, 
pp. 47-80.
Telford, T.A., Family and State in Qing China, in Institute of Modern History (ed.), Family 
Process and Political Process in Modern Chinese History, Taipei, Institute of Modern 
History, 1992, 2.921-42.
Yang S., Collective Killings in China during the Cultural Revolution, New York, CUP, 2011.
Ye X., Ming Qing Huizhou nongcun shehui yu dianpu zhi, Hefei, Anhui renmin chubanshe, 
1983.
Wang Mi., Space, Administration, and Territorial Cults in Late Imperial China, Late Imperial 
China, 1995, 16, 1, pp. 33-78.
Wang, D.Der-wei, The Monster that is History : History, Violence, and Fiction Writing in 
Twentieth-Century China, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2004.
Watson, J.L., Hereditary Tenancy and Corporate Landlordism in Traditional China : A Case 
Study, Modern Asian Studies, 1977, 11, 2, pp. 161-182.
